We consider pricing and selection with fading channels in a Stackelberg game framework. A channel server decides the channel prices and a client chooses which channel to use based on the remote estimation quality. We prove the existence of an optimal deterministic and Markovian policy for the client, and show that the optimal policies of both the server and the client have threshold structures when the time horizon is finite. Value iteration algorithm is applied to obtain the optimal solutions for both the server and client, and numerical simulations and examples are given to demonstrate the developed result.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing demands of wireless communication service, Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have been replacing the traditional wired network control systems. NCSs utilize wireless channels to communicate between sensors and estimators, and controllers and actuators [1] . It is well known that compared to wired systems, NCSs have a lower cost in installment, diagnosis, debugging and maintenance, and have diverse applications, including manufacturing industries, public transportation, aerospace vehicles and even military battles [2] .
Sensors with sensing, computing and wireless communication capabilities measure ambient conditions and transmit extracted and useful signals to remote estimators via wireless channels [3] . However, transmission may suffer from packet dropouts, delay, quantization and channel fading, which affect the performance and stability of real time systems. Transmission errors in physical network links and buffer overflows due to congestion are the typical reasons for packet dropouts [4] . Sinopoli et al. [5] show that if the average packet arrival probability does not reach a certain threshold, the system may diverge and will not be under control any more.
Nowadays, timely and accurate information is of great value. As the transmission service provider, the server should determine the communication channel prices. The wireless channel pricing for the server and channel selections for the client (which here means the sensor) are important. Game theory is introduced as a powerful tool to study the rational players' complex interactions. A player is rational if his decisions are consistent with his objectives [6] . Generally, a game. The issue of network pricing and bandwidth allocation is addressed in [10] based on the Nash bargaining framework. They show that the network revenue is maximized when the pricing scheme depends on users' budgets and bandwidth demands. Pricing and allocation related problems are also studied in [11] and [12] . Tushar et al. [13] study the pricing and charging problem of a smart grid and plug-in electric vehicle groups in a noncooperative Stackelberg game framework. They prove the existence of a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium (GSE) using convex optimization and provide an algorithm which leads to the GSE state of the game. However, scenarios in NCSs feature a dynamic process with infinite time horizon. It is not a static optimization problem.
In this work, we investigate a remote estimation problem with wireless communication channels. A Stackelberg game framework is modeled to interpret interactions between the sensor client and the channel server. The channel server aims to maximize its revenue while the sensor client aims to minimize the linear combination of remote estimation error covariance and the cost in a sequential order. We analyze the optimal policies for both players when they reach the equilibrium.
There are related applications in real life. Take Google Drive for an example, which provides 15 GB storage free of charge [14] . Premium plans are available for users with more storage space demands. For example, $1.99 / month with 100 GB, $9.99 / month with 1 TB and $99.99 / month with 10 TB are all upgraded alternatives. Obviously, network users are more and more in need of cloud storage, online sharing and backup. Some users are willing to pay more to enjoy the privilege. This scenario can be modeled as a Stackelberg game. As the resource holder, Google Drive is at a leading position, who sets the rules first. To profit most, Google Drive should ponder over its service and corresponding charge, taking the general user market into consideration in advance. While users decide whether to pay more based on their own needs. Both players intend to maximize their benefits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and the main problem. Section III proves the existence and monotonicity of the optimal deterministic and Markovian policy in the finite time horizon case. Section IV provides simulations and intuitive interpretations. Section V draws conclusions.
Notation: For a matrix X, we use X T and Tr{X} to denote its transpose and trace. When X is a positive semidefinite matrix, it is written as X ≥ 0. For two symmetric matrices X and Y , X ≥ Y means X − Y ≥ 0. R is the set of real numbers. E[·] is the expectation of a random matrix and E[·|·] is its conditional expectation. The notation P[·] refers to probability. For functions f , Consider the system in Fig. 1 . The discrete linear timeinvariant (LTI) process is as follows:
II. PROBLEM SETUP

A. System Model
where x k ∈ R n is the process state vector, w k ∈ R n is the process noise which is i.i.d. zero-mean white Gaussian with covariance Q ≥ 0. The measurement collected by the sensor is y k ∈ R m . The measurement noise v k ∈ R m is i.i.d. zeromean white Gaussian with covariance R > 0. The initial state x 0 is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with covariance Π 0 ≥ 0, which is uncorrelated with w k and v k . The pair (A,C) is assumed to be observable and (A, √ Q) is controllable. The smart sensor in Fig. 1 is capable of running a local Kalman filter. Its minimum mean-squared error state estimatê x s k|k and the corresponding error covariance P s k|k arê
which are computed via a Kalman filter as follows:
x s k|k =x s k|k−1 + K k y k −Cx s k|k−1 ,
Anderson and Moore [15] show that the estimation error covariance of the Kalman filter converges to a unique value P no matter what the initial value is. Define the Lyapunov operator h as h(X) AXA T + Q and Riccati operatorg as g(X) X −XC T CXC T + R −1 CX. We assume that the error covariance at the smart sensor has already reached steady state and let
where P is the unique positive semi-definite solution tog • h(X) = X as [15] shows. The error covariance P satisfies:
for any k 1 ≥ k 2 ≥ 0 (see [16] ). Furthermore,
This well ordering of the estimation error covariance is helpful to the further analysis. Fig. 1 portrays a two-player scenario. The process equipped with the smart sensor is the "client" and the communication network belongs to the "server". At each time k, the server has the priority to decide the price of the high quality channel 1, i.e., W H or W L . The price of the low quality channel 2 is fixed, always W 0 . Without loss of generality, we assume W H > W L > W 0 . It is then the client's turn to decide to use channel 1 or channel 2. If using channel 1, the probability thatx s k|k arrives error-free at the remote estimator is λ 1 . While using channel 2, the error-free arrival probability is λ 2 , where 1 > λ 1 > λ 2 > 0.
The server sets the price of channel 1. Define the price W k of channel 1 at time k as W k = W H , if the server sets high price, W L , if the server sets low price.
The client decides whether to use channel 1 or not. Thus the transmission ofx s k|k in the communication network can be characterized by a binary variable γ k :
1, if the client uses channel 1, 0, if the client uses channel 2.
Furthermore, the arrival of packets at the remote estimator can be characterized by a binary random sequence {δ k }:
1, ifx s k|k arrives error-free at time k, 0, otherwise.
Based on the error-free arrival probability of the two channels, we have
B. Remote Estimator
Denotex k and P k as the state estimate and error covariance at the remote estimator. If the packetx s k|k arrives error-free at time k, the estimator synchronizesx k withx s k|k from the smart sensor; otherwise, it just uses the time update value based on the system model (1) . The recursion ofx k iŝ
Correspondingly, the recursion of P k is
To simplify the problem, we assume that the initial state P 0 = P. At each time k, P k takes a value from the set P, h P , h 2 P , . . . . Note that the server is the owner of the communication network and it has a good knowledge of the channel transmission process. The server always knows exactly whetherx s k|k arrives at the remote estimator successfully. We assume that the remote estimator sends an Acknowledgment (ACK) to the client. The ACK is only a 1-bit signal to inform the client that whether the data packet arrives successfully or not. Thus this is a perfect-information case for both the server and the client.
III. FINITE TIME HORIZON GAME FRAMEWORK
Consider the following optimization problem in a Markov game framework. In the finite time horizon (k = 1, 2, . . . , N) case, for the client, its objective function J C is a linear combination of the trace of expected estimation error covariance and the cost when using different channels:
for some weight parameter ζ ∈ (0, 1). A larger ζ attaches more importance to the error covariance and a smaller ζ attaches more importance to the channel costs. For every {W k } given by the server, the client needs to determine the optimal action {γ k } to maximize its J C . While for the server, its objective function J S is the total revenue:
The server is at the leading position in this Stackelberg game. At each time k, it sets the price W k first and then the follower, the client, decides γ k sequentially. We define I S k as the information set available to the server up to time k, i.e., I S k = {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P k−1 } and I C k = {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P k−1 } ∪ {W 1 ,W 2 , . . . ,W k } for the client. Assume both players are rational, which means that they take the optimal actions based on their information sets respectively.
A. Client's Optimal Policy
In this section, we prove that for each fixed {W k }, the client's optimal policy is deterministic and Markovian, and has a threshold on P k−1 .
For each given {W k }, the remote estimator's state set observed by the client is S = Tr P , Tr h P , Tr h 2 P , . . . , Tr h N P due to the finite time horizon N, and the client's action set is A = {0, 1}. We formulate this optimization problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) problem. The stochastic kernel of the state at the remote estimator is given by:
It is obvious that the stochastic kernel p k (· | ·, ·)is stationary, which means it is only dependent on the state and the action. We can substitute p(· | ·, ·) for it.
The one-stage reward function for the client at time k = 1, 2, . . . , N can be written as:
Then the client's optimization problem can be transformed equivalently to an MDP problem as follows: 
for k = 1, 2, . . . , N where V k (·) is a real-valued function and V N+1 (s) = 0. The optimality equations are fundamental tools to study MDP problems [17] . If the expected total reward of a policy from period k onward satisfies these optimality equations for k = 1, 2, . . . , N, then it is optimal.
Theorem 1 Assume that the state set S is finite, and that the action set A is finite for each state s ∈ S. Then there exists a deterministic Markovian policy which is optimal.
Proof: Let V * k be a solution of the optimality equation 
then there exists an optimal policy which is deterministic and Markovian. The proof is given by Theorem 4.4.2 in [17] .
Here clearly such an a always exists if the action set A is finite.
The finite state set S and action set A in our problem determine the existence of a deterministic optimal policy. In addition, it is Markovian.
Next we prove that the client's optimal policy under each given {W k } has a threshold structure based on the state. To be more specific, we prove that there exists a positive ε k such that when the current state Tr{P k−1 } ≥ ε k , the optimal policy for the client is to use channel 1. This result has an intuitive meaning. If the remote estimation error covariance is extremely large, the client should choose the high quality channel 1 to ensure a higher packet arrival probability. Otherwise, the client will choose channel 2 to obtain a lower cost. Thus there is a trade-off between estimation quality and transmission cost. To prove this, some preliminary knowledge is needed. 
Definition 1 For the well ordered sets X and Y and a realvalued function g
Rewriting (28) and combining it with (29) yields
for all y ≤ f (x − ). Due to the definition of f (x),
The proof is done. We demonstrate the optimality of monotone policy by showing that the optimal value function V * k (s) for all k is nonincreasing in s ∈ S and then showing that 
is superadditive.
The optimal value function V * k (s) is nonincreasing in s ∈ S for k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Proof: Notice that in the finite time horizon problem, we have V * N+1 (s) = 0. It is trivial to see that V * N+1 (s) is nonincreasing in s. We prove the monotonicity in a backward induction way.
Assume that V * t (s) is nonincreasing for t = k +1, . . . , N +1. By Theorem 1, there exists an optimal a * s ∈ A which obtains the maximum of V k (s):
Let s ≥ s. Due to the well ordered state set S, it is easy to verify that r k (s, a) is nonincreasing in s for all a ∈ A and k = 1, . . . , N and the stochastic kernel p(s + | s, a) and p(s 0 | s, a) are only dependent on a for all s ∈ S.
Thus V * k (s) is nonincreasing for k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Proof: First we prove that r k (s, a) is superadditive.
which satisfies the definition of superadditive.
Since the sum of two superadditive functions is also superadditive, we need to prove that the rest of Φ k (s, a) is superadditive. Together with the nonincreasing property of V * k (s) from Theorem 2, we have
The proof is done. Thus we can conclude from Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 that the optimal policy for the client is nondecreasing in the state at each time epoch. In other words, there is a threshold based on the state when taking the optimal policy. For the finite time horizon case, it is feasible to obtain this deterministic Markovian optimal policy by value iteration and obtain its threshold.
B. Server's Optimal Policy
The server is the leading player in this Stackelberg game. In this section, we show that the server's optimal policy is also monotone. The larger the estimation error covariance is, the higher the price can be set.
In Theorem 4 below, we consider an extension to the current problem formulation where the server can set any price W k ≥ W 0 for channel 1.
Theorem 4
The optimal price W * k is nondecreasing in P k−1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Proof: Define the functions U k (·, ·) : S × R → R in a recursive way:
for k = 1, 2, . . . , N. We prove it using induction. Consider first the time N. If γ N = 1,
If γ N = 0,
The difference of (39) and (40) is
The server wishes the client to use channel 1 and at the same time, to set the price as high as possible. This implies:
Define the price threshold as
which is the highest price that can be set to ensure the client to use channel 1. It can be seen that the larger P N−1 is, the larger the price threshold W * N . As a consequence, the smaller U N (P N−1 ,W * N ) is. Now, assume that W * t is nondecreasing in P t−1 and U t (P t−1 ,W * t ) is nonincreasing in P t−1 for t = k + 1, . . . , N.
Then consider the time k. If γ k = 1,
If γ k = 0,
Similarly, the price threshold W * k is
Then W * k is nondecreasing in P k−1 and U k (P k−1 ,W * k ) is nonincreasing in P k−1 by the induction hypothesis. This monotonicity holds for all k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
For the original W H and W L case, the server sets the price
Thus the server's optimal policy at each time is characterized in Fig. 2 .
Fig. 2. Server's optimal policy
As the game leader, the server knows that at each given {W k }, the client makes decisions based on the current state. And the server can obtain the policy thresholds Tr{h L (P)} and Tr{h H (P)} for W L or W H by calculation. When the current state Tr{P k−1 } ≥ Tr{h H (P)}, the server knows that the client chooses channel 1 even if the price is W H . Thus setting W H maximizes the server's objective function. When Tr{h L (P)} ≤ Tr{P k−1 } < Tr{h H (P)}, setting W L is the server's optimal policy. When Tr{P k−1 } < Tr{h L (P)}, no matter what price the server sets, the state is still good and the client always chooses channel 2.
C. Equilibrium Analysis
This is a Stackelberg game model, where the server has priority over the client. For both the server and the client, they make decisions based on the current state. In the first period, the server sets the price. This decision is irreversible. In the second period, the client chooses a channel after observing the price given by the server. By value iteration, the threshold can be calculated and both players can obtain their optimal policies to maximize their objectives. This is the equilibrium in this scenario.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the optimal policies for both players.
Consider the example with parameters of the unsta- Consider the server's optimal pricing setting strategy. Assume that W 0 = 5, W L = 5.3 and W H = 5.5, and the finite time horizon is N = 5. The server's optimal policy is plotted in Fig. 4 . It can be seen that the server's optimal policy is monotone in the state at each time. The worse the current state is, the higher the price can be set. This "Fishing in Troubled Water" action makes server benefit most from the misfortunes of the client. However, the price cannot be set too high in case the client does not choose channel 1. Thus this optimal policy is of significance to the server.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered channel pricing and selection in a Stackelberg game framework. Using tools from Markov decision process, we proved the existence of an optimal deterministic and Markovian policy for the client and its monotone property in the finite time horizon case. Value iteration can be applied to calculate optimal policies both for the server and client. Future work includes considering the infinite time horizon case, and channel pricing and selection with multiple clients where the number of clients affects the transmission quality of channels. Also, imperfect information Stackelberg 
